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Abstract:  We ask whether MNEs’ experience of institutional quality and political 
risk within their “home” business environments influences their 
decisions to enter a given country. We set out an explicit theoretical 
model that allows for the possibility that firms from South source 
countries may, by virtue of their experience with poor institutional 
quality, derive a competitive advantage over firms from North 
countries with respect to investing in destinations in the South. We 
show that the experience gained by such MNEs of poorer institutional 
environments may result in their being more prepared to invest in other 
countries with correspondingly weak institutions. 
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1 Introduction 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) was, for a long period, considered to be a phenomenon of 
developed, industrialised countries (the “North”). This was especially the case with respect to 
the nationality of the investing firms, who were almost entirely based in the North with 
developing countries (the “South”) being hosts to a significant share of inward FDI flows but 
investing little themselves in overseas markets. Our research was sparked by the fact that this 
picture of global FDI flows is no longer accurate. It remains true that the South attracts a 
significant share of the world’s FDI. Figure 1 illustrates that the South’s share of global FDI 
inflows, while widely fluctuating, has risen over the past forty years from around 20 per cent to 
nearer 40 per cent of total FDI (UNCTAD, 2011). 
INSERT FIGURE 1 NEAR HERE  
Perhaps more significantly, the South has also become an established source of FDI. 
Figure 2 shows the the global share of FDI outflows attributable to firms from the South over 
the past forty years. In 1970, the South did indeed provide a negligible amount of the world’s 
FDI flows but its share has steadily risen such that, at the end of the first decade of the 
twenty-first century, the South contributed over 20 per cent of global FDI flows. Aykut and 
Ratha (2004) report that more than one third of total FDI inflows reported by developing 
countries now come from other developing countries, while for some small developing 
countries South-South flows amount to 90 per cent of the total FDI attracted. 
INSERT FIGURE 2 NEAR HERE  
While there is a wealth of theoretical and empirical literature that models FDI, this has 
focused on FDI coming from the North. There is a lack of literature that examines both FDI 
originating from the North and that from the emerging and developing multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) in the South. It would be useful to be able to establish whether these new 
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FDI outflows from the South differ in character from those traditionally arising in the North. 
Instead, many theoretical studies fail to incorporate mechanisms that could potentially explain 
the circumstances that emerging MNEs can exploit to give rise to an expected advantage in 
developing countries, while the vast majority of empirical studies still employ datasets that 
omit flows emanating from the South, so can investigate only North-North and perhaps 
North-South FDI flows. Alongside this, the established literature on outward FDI from the 
South is predominantly descriptive in nature and, as such, can only offer assertion on possible 
drivers of the outward FDI flows, or sometimes present evidence from specific case studies. In 
short, to date there is very limited use of theoretical and econometric analysis that both 
proposes and tests specific hypotheses of how North-South and South-South flows differ, or 
that seeks to identify and quantify the strongest and most significant determinants of 
South-South FDI flows. 
Existing studies have progressively given more weight to political and institutional 
determinants of FDI flows, and emphasise the importance of “good” institutions. However, to 
the extent that these studies have confronted data, they have primarily been directed at 
explaining why some South countries may find it hard to attract inward FDI flows. Among 
others, Wei (2000) and Globerman and Shapiro (2002, 2003) present empirical evidence on the 
negative impact of poor institutions/public governance on attracting FDI. Similarly Daude and 
Stein (2007) find that better institutions have a positive and economically significant effect on 
FDI, with the unpredictability of laws, regulations and policies, excessive regulatory burden, 
government instability and lack of commitment playing a major role in deterring FDI. That FDI 
flows into some high risk South countries have increased, despite poor institutions and public 
governance, is something of a paradox in this context. 
However, a smaller set of studies have suggested that there may be a divergence in the 
impact of these risk factors on different investors. For example, Aykut and Goldstein (2006) 
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suggest that experience with similar conditions to those in the chosen host country can result in 
lower risk aversion and hence make emerging MNEs more willing to enter “conflict zones” . In 
addition, Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), Cuervo-Cazurra, Maloney and Manrakhan (2007) and 
Cuervo-Cazurra and Genc (2008) have suggested that superior knowledge of how to operate in 
“challenging environments” is among potential advantages of emerging MNEs relative to 
those from the North. They assert that some emerging MNEs are likely to have acquired the 
ability to operate in a particular institutional environment over time in a learning-by-doing 
manner, while their counterparts in the North are likely to both lack this experience and to have 
to overcome “deep seated assumptions about operating in an international environment”.3 
However, although these verbal arguments have been made, they have yet to be systematically 
incorporated into theoretical models and comprehensively tested using appropriate data. 
The present paper can be seen as filling this gap. We model explicitly how MNEs’ 
experience of institutional quality and political risk within their “home” business environments 
influences their decisions to enter a given country. Our particular interest is in determining 
whether the increasing role played by multinational enterprises (MNEs) from the South is 
reflected in FDI in different investment environments. We ask whether the experience gained 
by such MNEs of poorer institutional environments has resulted in their being more prepared to 
invest in other countries with correspondingly weak institutions, as compared to MNEs from 
the North. Put simply, we ask whether investors from countries that have experienced poor 
domestic institutional quality are less deterred by country risk abroad. 
Javorik and Wei (2009) propose an alternative analytical model, but their focus is on 
the entry mode adopted by an MNE in the face corruption in the host country, finding that 
corruption tilts the choice towards joint ventures. They argue that having a local partner cuts 
through the bureaucratic maze associated with a corrupt environment. In this paper, we analyse 
                                                     
 
3For a related discussion see World Bank (2005). 
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the choice of location for MNEs, taking into account the quality of institutions in both the 
firms’ home countries and the potential destinations for their FDI.4 
This broader perspective suggests that the specific advantages of firms from the North 
are less valuable, or deflated, in the South since they require better developed markets and a 
stable, low risk, contracting environment. To the best of our knowledge, these arguments have 
not previously been formalised in a theoretical model. This is the contribution we offer in this 
paper. 
In the next section we set out a simple analytical model of FDI flows in which an MNE 
makes its choice of host based upon a comparison of the expected present value of profit 
achievable in each potential host country, taking into account institutional quality in both 
source and host nations. We quickly extend this model to incorporate the risk that the 
production facility in the host country will cease to return a profit to its owners. Importantly, 
we allow the source country’s previous experience with institutional risk at home to influence 
its perception of risks inherent in investing in other nations. Thus we explicitly allow for the 
likelihood that a firm that has faced institutional difficulties in its home country will have 
developed the skills that render similar problems overseas less problematic, relative to 
investors from other nations who have not been exposed to such risks. We show that poorer 
institutions in a potential host country make the expected return from FDI in that location less 
attractive. However, the greater the source country’s past experience of poor performance at 
home, the better able it is to cope with the risk to its FDI. 
Having demonstrated the inherent trade-offs that cause some firms to abandon a 
particular destination, but allow that destination to continue to attract more experienced 
investors, we conclude with a discussion of the empirical implications of our analysis. 
                                                     
 
4In our companion paper (Darby, Desbordes and Wooton, 2009), we take an empirical approach to determine 
whether institutional quality is a determinant of FDI flows. 
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2 A simple analytical model 
We develop a simple model of FDI in which an MNE operating in a particular industry and 
based in source country s chooses amongst a number of countries as potential hosts for its 
overseas production facilities. It will make its choice based upon a comparison of the expected 
present value of profits from production in each potential host, taking into account institutional 
quality in both source and host nations. 
A production facility in host country h will generate a flow of after-tax profits in each 
period equal to Πsh. For a firm from source country s, we define the gap between profits from 
locating in country i and country j as country i’s “geographical advantage”: 
 .sij si sjΓ ≡ Π −Π  (1) 
A broad range of factors may account for one country having a geographic advantage over 
another nation as the host for a firm’s FDI. Differences in the economic environments of host 
nations may arise with respect to: their rates of corporate taxation; the costs of local inputs into 
production such as labour; the sizes of their domestic markets; their levels of development (and 
resulting ability to assimilate the firm’s technology), etc. We do not model the reason behind 
these differences but merely accept that firms will find some investment locations more 
attractive than others. Clearly, the geographic advantage enjoyed by a potential host in one 
industry may not carry over to all sectors of the economy. 
The investment made by the MNE is expected to be productive and last into the future. 
Consequently, the firm will look at the present value of the expected stream of current and 
future profits. Assume, for now, that there is no risk involved in the FDI and that the plant is 
expected to maintain production (and profitability) indefinitely. The present values of the terms 
in (1) are 
 ( ) = ,
1
sh
shPV δ
Π
Π
−
 (2) 
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 ( ) = ,
1
si sj
sijPV δ
Π −Π
Γ
−
 (3) 
where δ is the discount rate of the firm.5 When investments have the same expected longevity, 
accounting for the future leaves the firm’s optimal choice of location for its FDI unchanged. 
We now consider the implications of international differences in the expected lifetimes of 
foreign production facilities. 
2.1 Institutional risk 
The life of the MNE’s overseas plant may be cut short for many reasons. We focus on problems 
with respect to the institutions in the host country. We suppose that there is a risk ρh in every 
period that the production facility in host country h will cease to return a profit to its owners in 
source country s. This may arise because of some catastrophic breakdown in the host country’s 
economy such that the firm is unable to continue producing. Alternatively, production may 
carry on but ownership of the firm is expropriated by the host country’s government. This risk, 
if it differs between source countries, will figure in the MNE’s calculations as to its preferred 
production location. We identify two influences on the MNE’s assessment of where it might 
best invest, labelling them the demonstration effect and the experience effect. The former of 
these would provide an explanation for repeated instances of FDI flows between any two 
particular nations while the latter seeks to explain why MNEs from different countries may 
choose different recipients of their FDI. We consider each in turn. 
In determining where to invest, a firm would want to take into account a broad range of 
characteristics of each potential-host country’s economy, including the risk to the FDI 
associated with poor institutional quality. However, there may be some factors that are not 
readily apparent to a potential investor and that would affect the expected profitability of 
producing in a particular country. Suppose that there are two potential hosts, identical in every 
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observable respect (including risk), except that one of the countries is already host to FDI from 
the same source country as that of the firm. The MNE might then be able to elicit information 
from its compatriot about local investment conditions, lowering the perceived risk to FDI in 
that country. Even in the absence of such knowledge transfer, the observation that an enterprise 
from its own country has set up in a particular host might be sufficient for an MNE to infer that 
market conditions in that particular location are relatively more favourable to firms with 
similar backgrounds. Thus, the demonstration effect captures the impact on a firm’s FDI 
decision of the presence of an existing investment by source country s in host country h. A 
positive demonstration effect would arise if, ceteris paribus, a firm were more likely to invest 
in a nation that was already host to FDI from the same source country. The demonstration 
effect would operate through mitigating the perceived risk to a firm in country s of investing in 
country h,  
 = shsh h
h
fdir
FDI
θ ρ
 
 
 
 
where fdish is the existing level of investment between the two countries, FDIh is the total level 
of investment in host country h, and 0 < θ(·) ≤ 1. Any evidence of FDI in a country, from 
whatever source, is likely to make a potential investor less concerned about problems with 
governance in that location but the demonstration effect would be reflected in a firm being 
more confident of its success in a potential host when a large proportion of existing investment 
has come from the firm’s home country. Thus, we would expect the first derivative of θ(·) to be 
negative.6 
We are particularly interested in determining whether the source country’s exposure to 
poor institutions at home has an influence on its perceptions of the risk inherent in investing in 
other nations. It may be the case that a firm having faced institutional difficulties at home will 
                                                     
 
6Of course, the familiarity between nations, that results in this sort of clustering of one nation’s FDI in a particular 
host in the South, may be reinforced by political and cultural ties, such as former or continuing colonial links. 
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have developed skills that render similar problems overseas less problematic, relative to 
investors from other nations who have never been exposed to such risks. Thus, our experience 
effect captures the impact of past exposure to institutional risk on a source country’s 
willingness to engage in FDI in a less-than-secure investment environment. We define εsh as 
the subjective probability of investing country s that FDI in country h will shut down in the 
current period. This can be modelled as 
 ( )1 ,sh s she rαε ≡ −  (4) 
where es is the source country’s experience of past, domestic, institutional risk, es < 1 and 
α > 0. For a host that is perceived to be free of risk (rsh = 0), the firm’s experience of dealing 
with poor institutions is irrelevant. Should the potential host be seen to have an uncertain 
investment climate (rsh > 0), an investing firm with relatively more experience of institutional 
risk will have greater confidence in FDI in country h than a firm based in a country with a less 
checkered past. Thus source country experience of poor institutions mitigates the institutional 
risk in the host country. 
We can rewrite (2), using (4) to incorporate risk, such that the expected present value of 
the profit stream to a firm from country s arising from FDI in country h is 
 ( ) = .
1
sh
sh
sh
EPV
δ δε
Π
Π
− +
 (5) 
The partial derivatives of (5) are 
 
( ) ( )
[ ]2
1
= < 0,
1
s shsh
h sh
edEPV
dr
αδ
δ δε
− − ΠΠ
− +
 
 
( )
[ ]
1
2= > 0.1
sh s h sh
s sh
dEPV e r
de
αδα
δ δε
−Π Π
− +
 
Thus poorer institutions in the potential host country lower the expected stream of profits, 
making FDI in that location less attractive. The greater the source country’s experience of poor 
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institutions at home, the better it perceives it will be able to cope with risk to its FDI. 
Now consider the firm’s investment choice between the two potential host countries, 
1 and 2. The firm will consider the expected present values of the two locations and will choose 
country 1 over country 2 if  
 ( ) 1 212
1 2
= > 0.
1 1
s s
s
s s
EPV
δ δε δ δε
Π Π
Γ −
− + − +
 (6) 
Rewriting expression (6), separating the risk elements, yields 
 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( )( )( )
1 2 2 2 1 1
12
1 2
1 1
= .
1 1 1
s s s s s s
s s
s s
EPV PV
δ δ δε ε δ δε ε
δ δ δε δ δε
− + Π − − + Π  Γ Γ +
− − + − +
 (7) 
This decomposition indicates that any geographic advantage that country 1 might enjoy is 
mitigated if country 2 is perceived to be a relatively safer investment environment. 
2.2 Different hosts for different sources? 
We have already established that source-country experience of poor institutional quality can be 
beneficial for FDI in hosts with poor institutions, but such experience is of no use for FDI in 
risk-free host countries. Thus there is the potential for firms, that are in all other respects 
identical save for their institutional experience, to perceive potential FDI returns differently 
when the hosts differ in institutional quality. Suppose that there are two firms from different 
source countries, A and B and that, for simplicity, we assume that the demonstration effect is 
either absent or the same for both firms. This allows us to omit the host-country subscript on 
the perceived risk term. The two potential hosts differ in that country 2 is completely safe but 
FDI in country 1 carries some risk, that is r1 > r2 = 0. We further assume that country B has had 
a more turbulent past than has rock-solid country A, that is eB > eA =0. This allows us to rank 
the perceived levels of risks associated with source and host pairs of nations: 
 1 1 1 2 2 2= > > = = = 0.A B A Br rε ε ε ε  
This characterisation of the four countries might be consistent with source country A being 
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from the “North” while source country B is from the “South”. With regard to the potential 
destinations for FDI, host country 2 could be considered more “Northern” than host country 1 
due to its more robust institutional framework.7 
We can then re-write (7) as 
 
( ) ( ) ( )( )
( ) ( ) ( )( )
1 1
12 12
1
1 1
12 12
1
= ,
1 1
= .
1 1
A
A A
B B
B B
B
rEPV PV
r
EPV PV
δ
δ δ δ
δε
δ δ δε
Π
Γ Γ −
− − +
Π
Γ Γ −
− − +
 (8) 
Suppose that, in the absence of uncertainty, the two firms would be equally profitable in the 
same host nation, that is, Πh = ΠAh = ΠBh for h ={1, 2}. Assume also that country 1 has a 
geographic advantage, such that PV(ΓA12) = PV(ΓB12) > 0. The second terms of the expressions 
in (8) are positive and thus the risk associated with FDI in country 1 will always offset its 
geographic advantage to some degree. Indeed, if FDI in country 1 is particularly risky, the 
relative stability of country 2’s institutions might be sufficiently large that it attracts FDI from 
both firms. However, country B’s firm has been exposed to poor institutions, making it better 
able to deal with any problems in country 1. Thus it may choose to invest in that location, if 
geographic advantage is large enough to offset the increased risk of closure, while country A’s 
firm opts for the more secure environment of country 2. 
Maintaining our assumptions regarding the institutional experiences of the four 
countries in question, we illustrate the circumstances under which each source country would 
choose FDI in the lower profit, risk-free host over investing in the riskier, but potentially more 
profitable, nation.8 Consider first how varying the experience with risk on the part of the firm 
changes the relative attractiveness of the two locations. 
                                                     
 
7This labeling convention that we have adopted, while rather crude, captures an important stylized fact that the 
more-established industrialized economies of the North tend to have better institutions and have had this high 
institutional quality for some time as compared to newly industrializing nations of the South. 
8We use the following parameter values: Πs1 = 1.0, Πs2 = 0.8, δ = 0.9, r1 = 0.1, r2 = 0, eA = 0, eB = 0.8 and α = 1.  
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INSERT FIGURE 3 NEAR HERE  
This is illustrated in Figure 3 which traces EPV(Γs12) as the experience of the source 
country changes. When EPV(Γs12) > 0, the higher return in host country 1 more that offsets the 
greater risk associated with investing in that country. The less experience a firm has of dealing 
with investment risk, the less able it is to deal with the poor institutional framework in the 
higher return country and it would choose low-risk country 2 instead. 
Effectively, a country with greater experience of host-country institutional problems is 
more willing to invest in a risky climate relative to placing its FDI in a safer host that has a 
lower return. In Figure 4, we illustrate the cases under which each source country may choose a 
different host for its investment and when they co-locate. 
INSERT FIGURE 4 NEAR HERE  
The lower line represents EPV(ΓB12) while the upper line shows EPV(ΓA12). When 
country 1 is as safe as its rival location for FDI, both firms will choose to invest there to take 
advantage of the higher profitability. The benefits for both firms from investing in country 1 
begin to be eroded as that country’s riskiness increases, but the impact will be more severe for 
the firm from country A, which has no experience of dealing with poor institutions. Thus higher 
risk in country 1 will eventually make country 2 the preferred location for the FDI of both 
firms. There will, however, be a range of levels of risk in country 1 at which the 
more-experienced firm from source country B will choose to invest there, while country A’s 
firm, with little experience of poor institutions, will abandon country 1 for the security of 
investing in the less risky location of country 2. 
3 Discussion and conclusion 
This paper addresses a gap in the existing literature by providing an explicit theoretical model 
that encompasses key determinants of North-South and South-South FDI. While a number of 
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authors have discussed the possibility that experience with risk may be a feature of emerging 
MNEs’ firm-specific advantage, to the best of our knowledge our paper is the first to formalise 
this hypothesis within an explicit theoretical model. Specifically we have set out an explicit 
theoretical model that allows for the possibility that firms from South source countries may, by 
virtue of their experience with poor institutional quality, derive a competitive advantage over 
firms from North countries with respect to investing in destinations in the South. 
Our paper addresses, to some degree, the paradox that while existing studies have found 
that the existence of “good” institutions in a host nation is a strong, positive determinant of its 
ability to attract FDI, nevertheless there is clear evidence of increasing FDI flows into South 
countries, despite many of these nations having poor institutions and public governance. We 
identify both a demonstration effect and an experience effect, each of which (acting in tandem) 
will have an impact of the pattern of FDI into host nations in the South. The demonstration 
effect arises when a firm’s perception of a potential host for its FDI is favourably impacted by 
the presence of production facilities of firms from its own country, as the firm becomes more 
confident in its ability to deal with a difficult investment given that its compatriots appear to 
have weathered any problems that have arisen. This willingness to invest in a risky 
environment is reinforced by the experience effect, where a firm’s exposure to poor institutions 
in its home country has better prepared it to override any such hurdles overseas, as compared to 
a firm that has not had to deal with domestic governance problems. 
In our companion paper (Darby, Desbordes and Wooton, 2009), we find empirical 
support for the experience effect. In future empirical work, we hope to identify both effects in 
the data and establish just how important institutional quality is for firms’ FDI decisions. 
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Figure 1. South’s share of global FDI inflows 
 
Figure 2. South’s share of global FDI outflows 
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Figure 3. Impact of experience on firm location 
 
Figure 4. Interaction between risk and experience  
